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**African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism
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**THE QUARTERLY
AFRICA TERRORISM BULLETIN
QATB**

Second Quarter

1st April - 30th June 2022

African Union 20 YEARS



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ABOUT AFRICA TERRORISM BULLETIN

In line with its mandate to assist African Union (AU) Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) to build their Counter-Terrorism capacities and to Prevent Violent Extremism, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) has developed tools that enable it to collect, analyse, process, and disseminate information on terrorism-related incidents occurring in Africa. One of the products of this effort is the quarterly Africa Terrorism Bulletin (ATB) that is published by the Centre.

The Q-ATB seeks to keep AU Member State Policymakers, Researchers, Practitioners and other stakeholders in the fields of Counter-Terrorism (CT) and the Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), updated quarterly, on the trends of terrorism on the Continent.

Notwithstanding the lack of a universally accepted common definition of **Terrorism**, the AU, in its **1999 OAU CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND COMBATING OF TERRORISM, Article 1 paragraph 3, (a) and (b), and Article 3**, defines what constitutes a **Terrorist Act**. The ACSRT and therefore the QATB defer to this definition.

ABOUT THE ACSRT/CAERT

The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established as a structure of the African Union in 2004. The decision to establish the Centre was taken in 2002 as part of the AU Plan of Action (PoA) to Prevent and Combat of Terrorism. Its primary role is to assist AU member States build their Counter-Terrorism capacities. Its mandate includes the conduct of research, analysis and studies on the terrorism situation and terrorist groups in Africa, maintaining a terrorism database, centralizing information on terrorism and sharing this with AU Member States. The Centre conducts assessment missions to various AU Member States in order to ascertain their Counter-Terrorism capability and compliance with International Legal instruments and then provide advice on what needs to be done. In its capacity building effort, the Centre conducts seminars, workshops, and training sessions in various aspects of Counterterrorism for Member States and facilitates the drafting of their Counter-Terrorism legislation, strategies, and Plans of Action in accordance with human rights requirements.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia; transformed to African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (<i>ATMIS</i>)
AMM	Africa Media Monitor
ANP	Armée Nationale Populaire
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AS	Al-Shabaab
ASWJ	Al Sunna WaJammah
AU	African Union
BH	Boko Haram
CAERT	Centre Africain d'Etudes et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme
CAR	Central African Republic
CT	Counter-Terrorism
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EUC-JRC	European Union Commission's Joint Research Centre
FAMA	Forces Armées Maliennes
FDPC	Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain
GFSN	Groupement des Forces pour la sécurisation du Nord
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IS	Islamic State (co-called)
ISCAP	Islamic State Central African Province
ISGS	Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
ISS	Islamic State in Somalia
ISWAP	Islamic State West Africa Province
JNIM	Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center
KUBN	Uqba Ibn-Nafi Battalion
LCB	Lake Chad Basin
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Forces
MINUSMA	Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali
MSA	Mouvement pour le salut de l'Azawad
NISA	National Intelligence Service Agency (Somalia)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PBIEDs	Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
RCIEDs	Remotely Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices
REC	Regional Economic Community
RM	Regional Mechanism
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAMIM	SADC Mission in Mozambique
SNA	Somalia National Army
UNSMIL	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Libya
US	United States (of America)
VE groups	Violent Extremist groups

SUMMARY

General Situation. 1st April 2022 to 30th June 2022 recorded 320 terrorist attacks that resulted in over 2,588 deaths across Africa. Attacks and deaths decreased by 16% and 8% respectively in comparable to the first quarter (Q1). Q1 recorded 379 attacks and 2,824 deaths respectively. In terms of monthly trend, June recorded the highest number of attacks and deaths compared to that of May and April, indicating progressive increments in terrorist attacks. June attacks of 130 are a 37% increase to April and May (95). With respect to casualties, there was an increase in the number of deaths from terrorist attacks in June. While there were 620 deaths recorded in April and 909 deaths in May, 1,059 deaths were recorded in June, representing 71% and 17% increase to that of April and May respectively.

Countries Most Affected. The five countries most affected by terrorist attacks during the period were: Burkina Faso, DRC, Nigeria, Mali, and Mozambique (*in decreasing order*).

Targets of Terrorist Attacks. While 190 out of the 320 terrorist attacks were launched against Civilians, 115 targeted Military/Security Forces. 09 attacks targeted International Organizations and 6 attacks targeted Governmental Institutions/Officials. The attacks by ASWJ, ISGS, Boko Haram, and ADF/ISCAP were mainly against Civilians, whilst Al-Shabaab, JNIM, and ISWAP mostly targeted Military/Security Forces.

Weapons Used. The terrorist groups used Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in 248 out of the 320 attacks and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were used in 48 of the attacks.

Deaths from Terrorists Attacks. 2,588 deaths were recorded during the period: 1,742 civilians, 461 Military/Security personnel and 385 terrorists.

Casualties Inflicted by Terrorist Groups.

ADF/ISWAP killed 300 persons (295 civilians, 5 Military/Security Forces); **JNIM** killed 278 persons (223 civilians, 55 Military/Security Forces); **ISWAP** killed 226 persons (140 civilians, 86 Military/Security Forces); **ISGS** killed 184 persons (173 civilians, 11 Military/Security Forces); **Al-Shabaab** killed 111 persons (18 Civilians, 93 Military/Security Forces); **ASWJ** killed 53 persons (40 civilians and 13 Military/Security Forces); **Boko Haram** killed 50 persons (45 civilians and 5 Military/Security Forces);

and other **IS affiliates** killed 48 persons (9 civilians, 39 Military/Security Forces). **Unknown groups** killed 953 persons (799 civilians, 154 Military/Security).

Casualties Sustained by Terrorist Groups. **JNIM**, **Boko Haram**, **Al-Shabaab**, **ISGS**, **ISWAP** and **ADF/ISCAP** suffered highest number of casualties during the period. Military/Security forces killed 295 of JNIM fighters, 142 Al-Shabaab members, 137 of Boko Haram and 115 ISGS terrorist members. Others ISWAP suffered 99 deaths and ADF/ISCAP suffered 43 casualties. 349 members of other unknown groups were also killed.

Kidnapping. 27 cases of kidnappings were recorded. A total of 460 persons were taken hostage in Nigeria, Mali, Cameroon, and DRC while 117 captives were released during the same period.

Focus on Epicentres. Out of the 320 terrorist attacks, the Sahel region recorded 82 attacks with 1055 deaths, the Lake Chad Basin recorded 71 attacks with 505 deaths, the Great Lakes region accounted for 36 attacks and 461 deaths and Horn of Africa region accounted for 24 attacks with 194 deaths during the period.

High Profile Attacks.

- **10 April, Kanam, Dengi, Plateau, Mali.** Gunmen attacked several communities of the local government area. 154 people were killed and, several others injured in the attack.
- **18 June, Diallassagou, Bankass, Mopti, Mali.** Armed men on motorcycles raided several villages in the region and killed over 132 civilians. Government blamed the attack on Katiba Macina militants an affiliate of JNIM, although group has denied responsibility.
- **11 June, Seytenga, Seno, Burkina Faso.** Armed individuals attacked a town, near the border with Niger accusing them of collaborating with the security. At least 100 civilians were killed in the attack believed to have been carried by ISGS.
- **02 May, El Baraf, Middle Shabelle, Somalia.** Armed militants from Al-shabaab attacked the AMISOM/ATMIS military base. At least 33 people were killed including 30 soldiers of Burundian nationality. Security forces in reprisal attacks also killed about 20 militants.

05 June, Owaluwa, Owo, Ondo, Nigeria. Gunmen attacked a St Francis Xavier Catholic Church during mass. At least 50 people including women and children were killed. Federal government blamed ISWAP for the attack.


Counter-Terrorism Response. CT operations resulted in neutralizing 889 terrorists. No Military/Security Forces died during those operations across the continent.

Conclusions/Recommendations. Even though the general number of terrorist attacks and deaths decreased marginally, most of the terrorist groups operating on the continent exhibited a great level of momentum. Despite the numerous CT efforts by state authorities concern, terrorist structures seem to be resilient. Preventative approaches and mechanisms that seek to build the resilience of local communities by addressing their vulnerabilities could go a long way to deny terrorist and violent extremists group their freedom of space and movement, thereby culminating into degrading their capabilities and cohesion.


First Quarter Vrs Second Quarter




Type of Attacks




Primary Targets of Attacks



Deaths per Category



Regional Attacks & Deaths



GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Background: Terrorism, Insurgency, and violent extremism have continued to be the primary threats to peace, security, national stability, and development on the African continent. The geography of terrorism and insurgency in Africa has dramatically increased over the past decade, and in more particular the last five years. Regions that previously did not perceive the seriousness of the threat, or were considered to be immune from terrorism, have been targeted by terrorist groups. The threats have remained resolute both in intent and capability, with growing confidence and cohesion in the launching of devastating attacks on civilians, security forces, and critical infrastructure across the continent. The terrorism phenomenon has developed into a complex mix of ideology-driven acts of violence, transnational organized crime, and insurgency. This is manifested in the multiplicity of armed groups with varying motives and trajectories that are spreading and unleashing violence across the African continent.

Objective: The objective of the Africa Terrorism Bulletin is to provide a quarterly assessment of terrorism and violent extremism situation and trends on the continent. This is aimed at providing African Union Member States up to date information on terrorism incidents and its related activities. The data for the analysis of this Bulletin, is limited to information open-source information collected and stored in the ACSRT Database, in conformity with the definition of terrorist acts as defined by the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism.

Database: The ACSRT maintains a robust database that stores information on terrorism, more specifically, on terrorist groups, their leaders and members, and activities and avails this information to the African Union Commission, the African Union Member States, Regional Economic Communities, and relevant Regional Mechanisms. In the framework of its Continental Counter-Terrorism Early Warning System (ACSRT CT-CEWS), information for the Database is collected by the ACSRT Situation-Room using the Africa Media Monitor (AMM) developed in collaboration with the African Union Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) Situation-Room in the AU Commission and the European Union Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) for advanced web mining and information extraction. With the AMM, the ACSRT Situation Room scans and accesses over 1400 websites 24/7 and retrieves real time open-source information on terrorist incidents. The Centre also stores terrorism-related information received from Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and relevant Regional Mechanisms (RMs) based on existing cooperation agreements. The AU Continental Early Warning Situation-Room and reports from AU Field Missions and other field missions are also sources of information for the bulletin.

Validation: To ensure credibility and reliability, the Centre validates all accessed terrorism incidents from the ACSRT National and Regional Focal Points. The Focal Points are the institutions in AU Members and RECs/RMs designated to collaborate and share terrorism and Counter-Terrorism related information with the ACSRT. In accordance with its mandate, the information validated by the ACSRT on the number of attacks, deaths and injuries recorded are considered as the official data for the ACSRT Database irrespective of other conflicting figures.

THREAT UPDATE

Atrocities committed by terrorist and violent extremist groups continued unabated across the continent. While the general trend of terrorist attacks declined marginally in most of Africa's epicentres of terrorist activities, the fatalities recorded in the **Sahel belt of West Africa** increased significantly. This is an indication that the groups operating in the Sahel particularly the **JNIM** and **ISGS** appeared resilient and exhibited a great level of freedom of movement and momentum in planning and executing attacks. During the reporting period, it was observed that some of the terrorist and violent extremist groups expanded their operations to new geographic areas, thereby recording incidents in national territories that had been spurred of terrorist attacks for years. The various terrorist groups appear to be executing a ground strategy of expanding their geographical reach and mobility corridors, with the strategic intent of controlling national territories and run criminal economies to sustain their violent activities, and to the benefit of local communities and populations that are sympathetic to their cause. The violence has created humanitarian catastrophe across the continent compounding the already humanitarian crisis caused by the COVID-19 Pandemic and the global recession.

In comparison to the first quarter of 2022, the second quarter witnessed rather a marginal decline both in the number of terrorist attacks and total number of deaths recorded for the period. The first quarter of 2022 registered 379 attacks that resulted in 2,824 deaths, while the second quarter, however recorded 320 attacks that resulted in a total death of 2,588. When comparing the preceding period to the current, there was a decline of 16% in terrorist attacks, and a marginal decrease of 8% in the number of deaths. The pattern relating to primary targets and the category of deaths changed slightly, but the type of attacks remained the same in both periods. Attacks against civilians reduced while that of military/security forces increased.

Sahel Belt of West Africa. The Sahel Belt of West Africa became the hotspots of complex and sophisticated attacks for the period under review. Although the region recorded a decline in the number of attacks as compared to the previous reported period, fatalities resulting from attacks increased sharply, demonstrating the brutal nature of terrorist attacks in the region. The Sahel region registered a total of **82 attacks and 1,055 resultant deaths**. Attacks were recorded in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. *The Liptako-Gourma region, an area covering the Tillaberi region of Niger; the Mopti, Gao and Menaka regions of Mali; and the Sahel, Nord, Est, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions of Burkina Faso* continue to drive the deteriorating violent activities in the Sahel. The concentration of terrorist attacks in the tri-border area of Liptako-Gourma and more precisely in the *Gao region*, around the commune of *Tessit* demonstrates the freedom of movement that terrorist groups enjoy particularly JNIM (the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims) and the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) along their mobility corridors. In this area, inhabitants of several villages such as *Tadjalalt, Tinaghy, Bakal or Kaygouroutan* have been forced to leave their homes. Undoubtedly, terrorist attacks are expected to continue apace or even increase following the withdrawal of Western Forces involved in Operation Barkhane and Takuba from Mali. The decrease in military pressure will further cause a rise in militancy while a decrease in military pressure against the hegemony of JNIM and ISGS will allow the groups to further consolidate their control and complicate efforts by the States Security Apparatus to re-establish control of these areas. In order to reverse the trend, the affected States may have to develop the ability to alter the strategic trajectory of the terrorist groups by operational raids, targeted strikes, and other military operations to serve as tactical and operational disruptors to militant groups.

Burkina Faso saw high levels of violence as terrorists killed over 500 people in 00 attacks and expanded hostilities into previously unaffected areas. The security situation has worsened over the previous reported period, signalling a consistent deteriorating situation since the beginning of the political instability that ousted **President Christian Roch Kabore's** democratically elected government. Even though the number of attacks declined for the period, the rate of fatalities increased by 72%, indicating the brutality and complex nature of attacks and the associated high lethality of the atrocities perpetrated by JNIM and ISGS. In Burkina Faso, a total of 18 out of the 45 provinces of the country were attacked, namely *Sourou, Soum, Gourma, Fada*

N'Gourma, Yatenga, Seno, Mouhoun, Bam, Namentenga, Tuy, Houet, Koulpelogo, Kompienga, Oudalan, Kossi, Sanmatenga, Loroum, and Kenedougou. Given the spread of terrorist activities in the country, there is the fear that Northern Burkina Faso could become a launchpad for terrorist organisations to entrench their expansionary activities into coastal states of **Benin, Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo**. In **Niger** the growing violence continue to plunge the Tillaberi and Diffa regions. However, new areas including the Capital Niamey and Agadez regions suffered terrorist attacks launched by perceived ISGS and JNIM militants. On 07 June, suspected JNIM militants attacked *Bougoum* town located in *Niamey* killing one soldier and injuring another one. The hint at a possible engagement with violent extremist groups by **H.E Mohamed Bazoum, President of Niger**, if well implemented could help address local grievances and end the hostilities against civilians and security forces alike, as dialogue involving traditional authorities, youth and women groups, gatekeepers and influencers and disgruntled groups in society could be an effective alternative in addressing terrorism and violent extremism. In **Mali**, violence skyrocketed, leaving hundreds killed as terrorist groups launched multiple attacks and engaged in intense fighting with security forces, notably in central regions. The terrorist activities continued to be perpetrated by the two rival groups ISGS and JNIM. The situation in Mali has also worsened compared to the previous reported period. The killing of over 154 people in an attack in several villages of Plateau on 10 April, and the attack on 18 June in Bankass, Mopti that killed 132 civilians in which JNIM was blamed, appears to be in consonance with the worsening security situation in the country. While the withdrawal of Western Forces involved in Operation Barkhane and Takuba from Mali may have bolstered the freedom of movement of terrorist groups, the economic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS have aggravated the deteriorating security and humanitarian crisis situations making the population more vulnerable to terrorists' recruitment drive. Given the current deteriorating situation in the Sahel Region, there is an urgent need for innovative and out of the box thinking approach that have the propensity to nib terrorism and violent extremism in the bud.

The expansion of terrorism and violent extremism into Coastal West Africa states became real, following the complex attacks in Northern **Togo and Benin**. The attacks have considerably heightened the risk level of littoral states. Northern Benin towns of *Alibori, Karimama, Dassari, and Tanguieta*, all located in the *Atacora Department* were attacked within the period. Terrorists suspected to be affiliates of JNIM attacked military and police posts causing significant number of casualties along the country's border with Burkina Faso. For example, suspected JNIM elements attacked a military convoy on 11 April, in Tanguieta town using IED, in which five Soldiers were killed and eight others injured. **Togo**, a coastal state that has been spared of violent atrocities despite its proximity to terrorism-affected countries is experiencing increased terrorism and violent extremism attacks. Violent Extremist groups continue to carry out attacks close to the northern borders that the country shares with Burkina Faso, Niger, and Ghana. However, on 10 and 11 May 2022, armed men believed to be militants of JNIM attacked a Togolese military outpost located in *Kpekpakandi*, a few kilometres away from neighboring Burkina Faso and killed eight (8) soldiers. Then on 16 June, gunmen attacked an army post in *Goulingoushi*, a town in Savanes region in the far northwest near the border with Burkina Faso and Ghana. These incidents have completely changed the security situations in Northern Togo and signal a conscious desire of violent extremist and terrorist organizations to establish a presence in Togo as part of a broader recruitment drive. Given the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel, littorals states may have to elevate their respective states of preparedness to effectively respond to the fallout of the insecurity in the Sahel and the consequent humanitarian crises based on regular security risk analysis. Under the current circumstances, the full operationalisation and the implementation of the Accra Initiative could prove strategically, operationally, and tactically relevant in nipping the threats in the bud.

Lake Chad Basin. The Lake Chad Basin (LCB) region registered 71 terrorist attacks that led to 505 deaths during the period; a reduction compared to the previous reported period. ISWAP attacks dominated terrorism activities in the LCB region with Boko Haram attacks rather limited to the Far North region of Cameroon. Almost all attacks in the Southwest region of Niger (Diffa), Northeastern Nigeria states of Adamawa, Borno,

Yobe and Taraba, and the Lake Chad area of Chad were perpetrated by ISWAP. Following the rivalries and the fighting between ISWAP and Boko Haram in the LCB area, ISWAP appeared to have overpowered Boko Haram and taken over territories that were originally under Boko Haram's control. Boko Haram has since begun developing operational theatres in other states of Nigeria including Niger and Kebbi states. The general reduction in the number of attacks in the LCB could be attributed to the counter terrorism operational successes of MNJTF as well as National Armies of Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon which have considerably degraded the capacities of Boko Haram and ISWAP in their operational areas.

The Far North region of **Cameroon** recorded the highest number of Boko Haram attacks within the LCB area. Civilian populations continue to bear the brunt of attacks by Boko Haram in this area. Given that Boko Haram attacks for the period were mainly in Far North Cameroon, Security forces may have to re-strategize to effectively degrade the group's capacities in the area. Enhancing the tactical operational capabilities of the deployed could help disrupt the groups freedom of movement. In **Chad**, terrorist attacks relatively remained low like the previous reported period, though the country recorded one of ISWAP's significant attacks in the region. On 07 June, ISWAP operatives activated two IEDs against an army convoy on the *Kiga-Negubu* road in which 14 Chadian Soldiers were killed and 25 others wounded. This attack was one of the most successful complex attacks against Chadian Army in recent times. The attack also demonstrates the need to develop strong political capabilities to fill the leadership vacuum created by the demise of President Idriss Déby Itno who was considered a stabilizing force and a major international ally in the fight against groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP. Violent protests in parts of the country including Abéché city in Ouaddaï region also continued, creating a conducive environment for terrorism to thrive. The initial government's initiative to consider Whole-Of-Society approach including the use of dialogue could further de-escalate the conflict. South-West **Niger** region of Diffa rather witnessed relatively low attacks mainly perpetrated by ISWAP. **Nigeria** was the most affected in the region. Terrorist attacks in the country became widespread, witnessing attacks in some states that were originally not affected. The Northeastern states of Adamawa, Yobe, Borno, and Taraba were heavily attacked by ISWAP, with Boko Haram focusing its attacks on other States outside the LCB. Boko Haram, having lost much of its area of operation in the LCB have expanded its activities into North-central state of Niger and Kogi. On 06 June, Gunmen suspected to be militants of ISWAP attacked a Catholic Church located in *Owaluwa, Owo in Ondo state* in which about 50 people including women and children were killed. The attack which received international condemnation is a proof of ISWAP and Boko Haram's presence in South-West after their penetration in Niger and Kogi. The growing insurgency and banditry in Northwestern states of Kaduna, Katsina, and Zamfara also continued.

East and Horn of Africa. The East and Horn of Africa region recorded 25 attacks resulting in 195 deaths. This translates into about 47% decline in attacks over the previous reported period and 37% of deaths. The reduction in attacks could be attributed to the resumption of Counter Terrorism operation activities by United States (US) Africa Command Forces, the enhanced capacity of the Somalia National Army with determination defeat terrorist groups as well tactical operational activities of AMISOM/ATMIS. These operations limited the movement of terrorist groups within their operational zones and theatres. Notwithstanding the casualties suffered by both Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), Al-Shabaab, known for its capabilities to manufacture sophisticated IEDs, executed a number of complex IED attacks during the period under review. **Somalia** experienced a decline in the number of attacks across the country. However, Al-Shabaab's cohesion to carry out planned complex and sophisticated attacks was evident in its attack against the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMISS). Notably, on 02 May in *El Baraf*, Hirshabelle, al-Shabaab militants attacked ATMIS base killing at least 30 soldiers of Burundian nationality.

Contrary to the first quarter, the intensity and frequency of terrorist attacks in **Kenya** reduced drastically. Counties such as *Lamu, Wajir and Garissa* bordering Somalia did not experience any terrorist attacks, with Mandera recording a single attack. On 28 April, unidentified armed men attacked a security post in *Burahache*

though no casualty was reported. Kenya Defense Forces intensified its patrols in preparation for the country's general election in August 2022, as a result several Al-Shabaab attacks have been thwarted and have weapons were recovered.

The Great Lakes and Central Africa Regions. The Great Lakes region recorded a total of 36 attacks resulting in 461 deaths. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) or the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) as well as violent extremist groups including the Mai-Mai, CODECO and M23 launched attacks in the Eastern **Democratic Republic Congo (DRC)** along *North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri* provinces. Civilian population suffered the brunt of ADF/ISCAP attacks, causing further security and developmental challenges to local communities already impoverished by long-standing unresolved conflicts. Barely a month after the DRC assumed membership of East African Community (EAC), the Congolese government commenced peace talks on 23 April 2022 in Nairobi, with representatives of armed groups operating in the country. Amid tensions between the DRC and Rwandan governments over alleged support of the latter to M23, the Congolese government took a decision to designate the M23 armed group, which has recently re-emerged and resumed its operation in the country's east, a terrorist organisation and excluded it from peace talks with armed groups on cessation of hostilities against security personnel and local communities. The EAC meeting in June 2022 in Nairobi have taken a decision to deploy a Standby Force (EACSF) to stabilise the situation in the Eastern DRC. While such deployment could prove beneficial in combative situations, the on-going peace talks should be vigorous pursued as a viable alternative to achieving lasting peace and security.

For the broader Central Africa region- rebel groups, separatist movements and violent extremists continue to generate insecurity in many countries thereby tormenting peace, security, stability, and hampering development of the region. Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that could Lead to Terrorism (VERLT) continue to remain a major concern in a number of instances. For the period under review, in **Central African Republic (CAR)**, more than 60 people were killed including security officials in various attacks perpetrated by rebel groups in *Bangui, Ouaka, Haute-Kotto, Ouham-Pende and Mbomou*. In **Cameroon**, Anglophone Separatist group attacked security posts and civilians and extended their atrocities beyond South-West and North-West Regions into the Littoral Region.

North Africa and the Maghreb. The activities of Islamic State (IS) in the region particularly in Southern Libya and the Sinai Peninsula surged. The region recorded 14 attacks that resulted in 66 deaths. In **Libya**, the Libyan National Army continues to battle IS cells in southern **Libya**, amid repeated attacks from IS in different parts of the country. On 18 and 25 April, IS claimed responsibility for two separate attacks in *Umm al-Aranib* and *Ghadwa*, all located in Southern Libya. Libya is at a perilous crossroad, owing to protracted political impasse which has weakened the coordinated efforts required to fight IS groups.


Terrorist activity in **Egypt's** Sinai Peninsula surged as Islamic State-affiliated militants launched their deadliest attack on the army in two years, killing a dozen soldiers. On 07 May, *Qantara, Bir al-Abd, located in Sinai Peninsula*, IS affiliated militants attacked military post killing at least 17 soldiers and injuring five others. Also, on 11 May, *Rafah*, in Sinai Peninsula, IS operatives attacked army checkpoint. At least 12 soldiers were killed. Security forces repulsed the attack killing seven of the assailants. Earlier, on 22 April, in *Al-Muqata'a town also in Sinai Peninsula*, exchanges of fire between suspected IS militants and Sinai Tribal Union fighters, a pro government militiamen left at least seven members of pro-government militiamen killed. The resurgence of these attacks and many others are worrying, as the Egyptian Army previously had significantly weakened the group. There is an urgent need to interrogate the recent resurgence in IS activity to understand what is emboldening the group's momentum and resilience. The Egyptian government has rigorously bidden for investment in the Sinai, in an effort to encourage the population that had fled the area due to IS activities to return. The resurgence, if not reversed could derail the efforts of the government and put local economic development initiatives in shambles. **Algeria** continued counter terrorism operation leading to the destruction of terrorist elements and recovering large volumes of ammunitions and equipment.

Southern Africa Region. The region recorded 45 terrorist attacks and 110 resultant deaths. All the attacks took place in **Mozambique**. Terrorism in the region continued to be predominantly dominated by Islamic State (IS) linked Al Sunnah Wal-Jummah (ASWJ) operating in Northern Mozambique Province of Cabo Delgado, expanding its geographical reach into other areas previously not affected. Insurgents advanced into the southern districts of Cabo Delgado province, launching attacks in areas previously unaffected by the nearly five-year old insurgency. *Ancuabe and Chiure district* within Cabo Delgado begun witnessing attacks in June. Also, *Nampula province* suffered its first attack since the start of the conflict five years ago, when insurgents attacked the village and beheaded a civilian. The movement of insurgents into new operational corridors could be pressure from counter terrorism offensives hence the group retreats to these areas for safe haven; previously intense counter terrorism operations allegedly drove insurgents across the border into Mtwara southern province of Tanzania. Targeting new areas could also be insurgents' tactic to stretch security forces and their allies, and subsequently create a space they need in Cabo Delgado's coastal districts where they have already established themselves. In addition, lack of coordination among deployed forces.

Despite the series of counter terrorism operational successes of the Mozambican security forces and intervening forces, the on-going insurgency seem to be resilient. The fact that insurgent groups appear to enjoy apparent freedom of movement within Northern Mozambique reflects a poor level of strategic coordination between the deployed international forces that are each responsible for their own operational areas. Coordination between Rwandan security, Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) Forces and Mozambican forces operating whether within the same theatre or different must be enhanced. With the presence of multiple foreign military deployments in Mozambique, establishment of joint command and control centre could assist in coordination and prevent duplication of efforts. The AU pledged during its Extraordinary Summit on Terrorism held on 28 May 2022 in Malabo, to deploy African Standby Force (ASF) in Northern Mozambique. Within the period also, Italy, Sweden, and Lithuania joined the European Union Military Training Mission in Mozambique, in the context of the fight against terrorism increasing the number of EU countries in Mozambique to fourteen. These kinetic militaristic approaches if combined with local community based preventing violent extremism initiatives could help defeat terrorism in Mozambique

NUMERICAL DATA: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

AFRICA TERRORISM INCIDENTS MAP: FROM 01 APR -30 JUN. 2022




Map 1: Terrorism Attacks from 1st April to 30th June 2022: Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

1. Total Number of Terrorist Attacks:

A total of 320 terrorism and violent extremism incidents including 27 cases of kidnapping were recorded from 1st April to 30th June 2022.


Figure 1: Trend in Terrorist Attacks: Apr.- Jun. 2022



Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

2. Terrorist Attacks by Region

Figure 2: Percentage per Region




Number of Attacks per Region:

- West Africa: **158**
- Central Africa: **77**
- Southern Africa: **45**
- East Africa: **25**
- North Africa: **14**


Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

3. Trends in Regional Terrorist Attacks



Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

4. Type of Attacks



Type of Attacks:

- SALWs: **248**
- IEDs: **40**
- Mixed (IED&SALW): **05**
- Kidnapping: **27**

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

5. Type of Attacks by Terrorist Groups


Table 1: Types of Attacks by Terrorist Groups

Terrorist Group	SALW	IED	Mixed	Kidnapping	Comments
Al-Shabaab	10	13	-	-	Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) constituted the major means of attack by Al-Shabaab for the period under review. Thirteen out of the 23 attacks were done using IEDs, 10 SALW.
ADF/ISCAP	15	-	1	-	ADF carried out 16 attacks using 15 SALWs, one IED.
Boko Haram	13	1	-	2	Boko Haram carried out 16 attacks using 13 SALWs and one IED and responsible for two kidnappings.
ASWJ	20	-	-	-	All attacks by the IS linked ASWJ were carried out using SALWs.
ISWAP	21	4	1	0	ISWAP carried out 21 attacks using SAWL and another 4-attacks using IED, and 1 kidnapping.
ISGS	9	1	-	-	ISGS attacks are predominately carried out using SALWs. Nine out of the 10 attacks were SALW
JNIM	21	-	-	1	JNIM attacks are predominately carried out using SALWs. 21 out of the 22 attacks were SALW
Other IS Affiliates ⁺	10	2	-	1	Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) constituted majority of means of attacks by other IS affiliates.
Unidentified Groups*	127	19	3	23	Unidentified groups used SALWs in majority of the attacks. In 127 out of 172 attacks by these groups, SALWs were used. They used IEDs in 19 attacks. They were also responsible for 23 cases of kidnappings.
TOTAL	248	40	5	27	

⁺ Other Islamic State (IS) Affiliates are all splinter IS affiliated groups mainly operating in the North Africa Region including Sinai Peninsula (IS-SP- Egypt) and Southern Libya.

* Unidentified Groups are all terrorist attacks carried out by the various known terrorist groups operating in Africa, but either did not claim responsibility for the attacks, or security forces did not attribute the attack to any group. Even though, the attacks might have taken place in an operational theatre of a known terrorist group, without claiming of responsibility by the group or attribution by Security Forces or ACSRT Analysts, it is left as Unidentified Groups. In addition, Violent Extremists groups such as Separatists in the Anglophone Region of Cameroon, Banditry activities in North Western Nigeria, whose attacks have been conveniently classified as terrorist act by the Member States concerned are captured under Unidentified Groups.


Figure 5: Types of Attacks by Terrorist Groups



Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

6. Primary Targets

Figure 6: Primary Targets of Attacks



Primary Targets

- Civilians: **190**
- Military/Security Forces: **115**
- International Organization: **09**
- Government Institutions/Officials: **06**

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022


7. Terrorist and Groups and their Primary Targets

Table 2: Details of Terrorist groups and their Primary Targets

Terrorist Groups	Civilians	Military/ Security	Gov't Inst./ Of.	Int. Org.	Comments
Al-Shabaab	5	13	1	4	Al-Shabaab carried out 5 attacks against civilians, 13 attacks against Military/Security Forces. They also carried out 1 attack against Government Institutions/Officials, while 4 attacks on international organizations including ATMIS (AMISOM).
ADF/ISCAP	15	1	-	-	Civilians bore the brunt of all attacks perpetrated by ADF/ISCAP in Eastern DRC.
Boko Haram	16	-	-	-	Civilians were the major targets of Boko Haram attacks, as all 16 of the groups targeted civilians
ASWJ	16	4	-	-	Civilians in local communities were the major targets of IS linked ASWJ attacks, as 16 out of the group's 20 attacks targeted civilians
ISWAP	11	15	-	-	Unlike Boko Haram, Majority of ISWAP attacks targeted Military and Security Forces. Fifteen attacks targeted Military/security while 11 targeted civilians.
ISGS	9	1	-	-	Majority of ISGS attacks were against civilians. Out of 10 attacks, 9 attacks targeted civilians.
JNIM	8	16	-	-	JNIM focused majority of its attacks during the period on Military and other security forces. A total of 16 out of the 22 attacks of the group targeted military/security.
Other IS Affiliates	3	10	-	-	Other IS Affiliates carried out three attacks against civilians and 10 attacks against Military/Security Forces.
Unidentified groups	107	54	5	5	Attacks for which no group claimed responsibility mostly targeted civilians. 118 out of 177 attacks targeted civilians; 54 targeted Military/Security Forces, 5 targeted Government Institutions/Officials and 5 targeted International Organizations.
TOTAL	190	115	06	09	

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

Figure 7: Terrorist groups and their Primary Targets




Source: ACSRT Database, 2022


8. Total Deaths

A total of 2,588 terrorism related deaths were recorded from the 320 terrorist attacks from 1st April to 30th June. Also, 467 people were injured during the attacks.

Figure 8: Trend in Terrorism Related Deaths



9. Deaths per Category




Deaths per Category

- Civilians: **1,742**
- Military/Security Forces: **461**
- Terrorists: **385**

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

10. Deaths Per Region




Percentage of Deaths per Region

- **West Africa** recorded **60%**
- **Central Africa** recorded the highest number of deaths accounting for **26%**.
- **East Africa** recorded **8%** of deaths.
- **Southern Africa** recorded **4%** of deaths.
- **North Africa** recorded less than **2%** of deaths


Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

11. Trends in Regional Deaths



Source: ACSRT Database, 2022


12. Regional Deaths by Categories



Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

13. Deaths per Type of Attacks

Figure 13: Deaths per Type of Attacks



Deaths by Type of Attacks

- SALWs: **2,341**
 - IEDs: **204**
 - Mixed (SALW & IED): **39**
 - Kidnapping: **04**
- **SALWs** accounted for **90%** of the deaths occasioned by terrorist attacks.
 - **8%** of deaths were as a result of **IED attacks**.
 - **2%** of deaths is attributed to complex attacks involving the use of **IEDs**, **SALWs** and **Kidnapping**.

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022


14. Attacks and Casualties Inflicted per Terrorist Groups

Table 3: Attacks and Casualties by Terrorist Groups

Terrorist Group	Number of Attacks	Number of Deaths	Comments
Al-Shabaab	23	111	Al-Shabaab carried out 23 attacks, killing 111 persons.
ADF/ISCAP	16	300	ADF/ISCAP carried out 16 attacks, killing 300 persons.
Boko Haram	16	50	Boko Haram carried out 16 attacks, killing 50 persons.
ASWJ	20	53	ASWJ carried out 20 attacks, killing 53 persons.
ISWAP	26	226	ISWAP carried out 26 attacks, killing 226 persons
ISGS	10	184	ISGS carried out 10 attacks, killing 184 persons.
JNIM	24	278	JNIM carried out 24 attacks, killing 278 persons
Other IS Affiliates	13	48	All other IS Affiliates groups in total carried out 13 attacks, killing 48 persons
Unidentified Groups	172	953	172 attacks were carried out by groups from which nobody claim responsibilities. These attacks added up to 953 deaths.
TOTAL	320	2588	

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

Figure 14: Casualties Inflicted by Terrorist groups



Source: ACSRT Database, 2020

15. Members of Terrorist Groups Killed (In Attacks and CT Operations)

Table 4: Details of Casualties Sustained by Terrorist Groups

Terrorist Group	Number Killed	Comments
Al-Shabaab	142	142 Al-Shabaab members were killed.
ADF/ISCAP	43	43 ADF/ISCAP members were killed
Boko Haram	137	137 Members of Boko Haram were killed
ASWJ	20	20 ASWJ Members were killed
ISWAP	99	99 members of ISWAP were killed
ISGS	115	115 terrorists killed were from ISWAP group.
JNIM	296	296 members of JNIM groups were killed
Other IS Affiliates	33	In total 33 members of various IS Affiliates groups killed
Unidentified Groups	349	A total of 349 terrorists killed were from Unidentified groups.
TOTAL	1,263	

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

16. The Five Most Affected Countries


Table 5: Five Countries Most Affected

Country	Total Attacks	Total Deaths	Total injured
Nigeria	68	486	76
Mozambique	45	110	18
Burkina Faso	38	511	55
DRC	35	503	30
Mali	31	433	43
TOTAL	217	2,043	222

Source: ACSRT Database, 2020

- **Nigeria** recorded the highest number of **attacks (68)** resulting in 486 deaths.
- **Mozambique** also recorded 45 attacks resulting in the **110** deaths.
- **Burkina Faso** recorded **38 attacks** resulting in **511** deaths.
- **DRC** recorded **35** attacks resulting in **503** deaths.
- **Mali** recorded the lowest number (**31**) among the five most affected countries for the period, resulting in 433 deaths

Figure 15: Five Most Affected Countries



Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

TERRORISM ATTACKS

MOST FATAL ATTACKS

17. High Profile Attacks


Table 6: List of high-Profile Attacks

No	Country	Place	Date	Group	Deaths	Description
1	Mali	Plateau	10 April	Unidentified Group	154	Unidentified armed men attacked several villages. 154 people were killed and, several others injured in the attack. The bandits also abducted 70 people, mostly women.
2	Mali	Mopti	18 June	JNIM	132	Armed men on motorcycles raided several villages in the region and killed over 132 civilians. Government blamed the attack on Katiba Macina militants an affiliate of JNIM.
3	Burkina Faso	Seno	11 June	ISGS	100	Armed individuals attacked the township in northern Burkina Faso, near the border with Niger accusing them of collaborating with the security. At least 100 civilians were killed.
4	DRC	Ituri	18 April	Unidentified Group	80	18 April, Walese, Vonkutu, Basili, Irumu, Ituri. Unidentified gunmen attacked the village and killed 80 civilians and several cars were burned in the attack.
5	Nigeria	Zamfara	06 May	Unidentified Group	63	Gun wielding motor-riding terrorists attacked the farming communities. At least 63 persons were killed in the attack.
6	Niger	Tillaberi	14 June	JNIM	58	A detachment of the Warou gendarmerie was attacked by suspected JNIM militants. Eight gendarmes were killed and 33 injured during the attack. About 50 of the attackers were killed in a reprisal attack by French Barkhane forces.
7	Somalia	Middle Shabelle	02 May	AL-Shabaab	53	Armed militants attacked the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) military base. At least 33 people were killed including 30 soldiers of Burundian nationality. Security forces in reprisal attacks also killed 20 militants. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack.
8	Somalia	Galgaddud	17 June	Al-Shabaab	53	Al-Shabaab militants detonated vehicle-borne explosive device in the town, killing at least six people comprising of 3 soldiers and 3 civilians. Security forces and local militia group repulsed the attack killing 47 of the terrorists.
9	Nigeria	Ondo	05 June	ISWAP	50	Gunmen attacked a Catholic church during mass. At least 50 people including women and children were killed, as well as many others injured. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack, but authorities blamed ISWAP for the attack.
10	Burkina Faso	Kompienga	25 May	Unidentified Group	48	Unidentified armed men attacked the locality, killing over 50 people. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

18. Attacks in Epicentres

Figure 16: Percentage of Attacks in Epicentres


**Total Attacks in Epicentre: 213**

- Sahel Region: **82**
 - Lake Chad Basin: **71**
 - Great Lakes Region: **36**
 - Horn of Africa: **24**
- Within the period under review, **Sahel region** recorded 26% attacks in Africa
 - **Lake Chad Basin** recorded 22% of all attacks
 - **Great Lakes Region** (DRC) recorded 11%
 - **Horn of Africa** recorded 8% of all attacks that took place in the epicentres

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

19. Deaths Recorded in Epicentres

Figure 17: Deaths in Epicentres

**Total Deaths in Epicentre: 2,215**

- Sahel Region: **1055**
 - Lake Chad Basin: **505**
 - Great Lakes Region: **461**
 - Horn of Africa: **194**
- Within the period under review, **Sahel region** recorded 41% of deaths in Africa
 - **Lake Chad Basin** recorded 20% of all deaths
 - **Great Lakes Region** (DRC) recorded 18% of all deaths
 - **Horn of Africa** recorded 7% of all deaths that took place in Africa

Source: ACSRT Database, 2022

EVALUATION OF DATA TREND: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

20. Attacks and Fatalities

The second quarter of 2022 recorded 320 terrorist attacks across the continent. For the period under review, the total number of resultant deaths in Africa was 2,588. Attacks and deaths decreased by 16% and 8% respectively in comparable to the first quarter (Q1). Q1 recorded 379 attacks and 2,824 deaths. In terms of monthly trend, June recorded the highest number of attacks and deaths compared to that of May and April, indicating progressive increments in terrorist attacks within the quarter. June attacks of 130 are a 37% increase to April (95) and May (95). With respect to casualties, there was an increase in the number of deaths from terrorist attacks in June. While there were 620 deaths recorded in April and 909 deaths in May, 1,059 deaths were recorded in June, representing 71% and 17% increase to that of April and May respectively.

Majority of the complex attacks for the period happened in the month of June. For example, the *June 5* attack by ISWAP on Catholic church killed over 50 Christians in Ondo, Nigeria. Further, on *11th June* ISGS killed over 100 people in Seno, Burkina Faso, followed by the *14th of June* attack by JNIM in Tillaberi, Niger in which 58 people died. Also, on *17th June*, Al-Shabaab killed 53 people in an attack in Galgaduud, Somalia. Following that JNIM on the *18th of June* killed over 132 people in Mopti, Mali. These incidences and others accounted for the high number of attacks and fatalities recorded in June. Also, the June attacks enumerated above accounted for the high number of attacks and deaths in West Africa, as the region accounted for almost 50% and 60% of attacks and deaths in Africa for the period respectively. Again, in West Africa, *ISGS, ISWAP and JNIM* appeared to enjoy some freedom of movement and launched complex and devastated attacks against both civilian and security forces alike particularly within the *Liptako-Gourma* area. These groups remained resilient within the reported period.

From the above data trend, there was a general increase in monthly attacks and associated deaths. The data also shows approximately 5 deaths per attack within the second quarter, lower than the 7 deaths per attack recorded in Q1. This lethality rate is still on the high. It is instructive to note that the available data further suggests at least 4 terrorist attacks each day for the first quarter of 2022, and at least 31 people died of terrorism each day in Africa for the first three months of the year.

Of the registered 2,588 deaths 1,742 were civilians, 461 were Military/Security Forces while 385 were terrorists. Consistently, civilians continue to bear the brunt of terrorist attacks. The number of men in uniform that fell on the battlefield remain significantly high. The number suggests that every day in Africa 5 security personnel is killed by terrorist groups. Enhancing the operational and intelligence capabilities of the deployed troops, through counter terrorism pre deployment training and retooling of the continent on the battlefield could go a long way to reduce the number of fatalities suffered by the security forces.

21. Targets of Terrorist Attacks

Most attacks were against Civilian targets at 190 (59%), 115 (36%) were against Military/Security forces, 09 (3%) were against International Organizations while 6 (2%) targeted Government Institutions/Officials. Although, Civilians were mostly the targets of terrorist groups, the proportion of attacks against civilians decreased while that of the military/security forces increased. The lack of ability of security forces to protect whistleblowers who divulge information to the security forces continue to undermine the relationship between local population and government forces. In a number of the local communities, civilians have been executed by terrorist groups on accusation of collaborating with security forces. These situations continue to make civilians vulnerable to terrorist attacks and further reduce their trust in the security forces abilities to protect them. Local communities and the population remain key in defeating insurgent groups and detecting their movement particularly along border communities. But how terrorist and violent extremist groups can identify the identity of civilians who divulge information to security forces remain a concern to be urgently addressed. Whistleblower protection must be enhanced, and community members must be trained on how to securely provide information without undermining their own security.

Attacks on vulnerable targets particularly places of worship became rampant. Leaders of churches may have to enhance their security and ensure the protection of worshippers. For International organisations, MINUSMA in Mali and the AMISOM/ATMIS in Somalia came under heavy attack. About 30 soldiers of Burundian nationalities were killed by Al-Shabaab. MINUSMA, whose operations does not include counter terrorism, continue to suffer from terrorism. Egyptian contingent serving under MINUSMA suffered significant number of casualties as about 7 soldiers were killed within the period, prompting the Egyptian Army to announce suspension of its peacekeeping mission in Mali by Mid-August.

22. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) continue to be the most common type of attack, as it accounted for 77% of total attacks higher than those recorded in Q1 and resulted in 2,341 deaths. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) accounted for 13% of the attacks and led to 204 deaths, Mixed (SALWs and IEDs) accounted for 2% of the attacks causing 39 deaths while Kidnappings accounted for 8% of the attacks. Most terrorist groups in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, Great Lakes Region, and Northern Mozambique attacked using SALW. However, in the East and Horn of Africa, IED constituted the major means by which terrorist groups operating in the region attack their targets.

The illicit proliferation of SALWs has increased in both frequency and intensity mainly due to the porosity of borders and activities of transnational organized crime networks groups across Africa. Characteristics of SALWs have made these weapons attractive to non-state actors hence increased illicit proliferation and circulation. They are readily available on international market, easily obtainable through both legal and illicit means and they are cost-effective. SALWs require little training as well as little maintenance. They are portable hence easily transported and smuggled to areas of terrorism and violent extremism. Proper monitoring on the importation and use of SALWs, availability of database on SALWs at the national levels as well as disrupting illegal route for arms trade could significantly reduce the illicit proliferation and circulation of SALWs. On the use of IED, degrading the technological and manufacturing capabilities of Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa could possibly curtail the transfer of such capabilities among terrorist groups on the continent. Al-Shabaab IED manufacturing capabilities is unmatched. The easy accessibility and availability of materials particularly in mining areas will have to be checked. Also, pre-deployment trainings on the technical identification and destruction of IEDs should form an important component of contingent's deployment for peace keeping and peace support operations.

23. Terrorist Groups Activities

The **Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)** came across as the group with highest number of terrorist attacks for the period. The group carried out a total of 26 attacks that resulted in 226 deaths comprising 140 civilians and 86 military/security forces. Majority of ISWAP's attacks targeted Military/Security as 15 out of 26 attacks were of Military/Security targets while 11 were civilian targets. In terms of modus operandi, the group made use of both IED and SALW. ISWAP dominated terrorist attacks in North-eastern Nigeria States of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa and Taraba. The group also expanded its hostilities into new states in Nigeria including Kogi, Ondo, and Kebbi. ISWAP appeared to have driven away Boko Haram in the LCB and exhibited a great level of freedom of movement within the LCB and beyond. The attack at St Francis Catholic Church in Owo, Ondo, in which suspected ISWAP militants killed over 50 people lends credence to the group's expansionary drive.

JNIM, an al-Qaeda affiliate group that operates in the Sahel also exhibited great momentum and carried out devastated attacks on both civilian and security forces. The group carried out 24 attacks killing 278 persons. Similarly, like ISWAP, JNIM focused its attacks on the security forces, as 16 out of the group's 24 attacks targeted military/security. JNIM enjoyed some freedom of movement within its mobility corridors

particularly in the Liptako- Gourma area, and further expanded its activities into west Africa coastal states of Benin and Togo. On 11 May, suspected JNIM militants attacked a Togolese military outpost killing 8 soldiers, an attack that has changed the security situation in Northern Togo and the coastal states in general. Disrupting JNIM's influence in the coastal states will have to involve some PVE measures that address the vulnerabilities of local communities. In this regard, the full implementation and operationalisation of the Accra Initiative could help stabilise the situation and reduce the threat level. The **Alliance Democratic Forces (ADF)** now operating under the **Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP)** killed the highest number of people (300) for the period. Contrary to JNIM and ISWAP, civilians continue to suffer the brunt of ADF/ISCAP in the North-Kivu and Ituri provinces of Eastern DRC. There is the need to prioritise the protection of local population in DRC to enable them to live in dignity, peace, and stability.

Al-Shabaab, another al-Qaida group operating in the Horn of Africa had restricted movement attributed to the resumption of counter terrorism operations by AFRICOM, the enhanced and persistent operations by the SNA and the coordinated response by the troops deployed under AMISOM/ATMIS. Also, the continued patrol and offensive along the borders with Somalia by the Kenyan Defense forces prevented attacks in the Kenyan counties of Wajir, Mandera, Garissa and Lamu. Notwithstanding the disruptors to the group's activities, the group managed to carry out a sophisticated attacks against ATMIS military and killed about 30 soldiers of Burundian nationality. In all, Al-Shabaab carried out 23 attacks and killed 111 persons. Like JNIM and ISWAP, the group targeted security forces in majority of its attacks within the period. Al-Shabaab continued to exhibit its prowess over the manufacturing of IED, a capability the needs degrading. **Boko Haram** which also operates in LCB targeted civilians more. Unlike ISWAP which appears to develop a strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the local population, Boko Haram continue to target the civilian population. The groups' attack was limited to the Far North of Cameroon. The limitation in the group's attack may be attributed to the degrading of the group's capability by the MNJTF and the renewed fighting with ISWAP. Having lost its operational zone in the LCB, the group has begun attacking North central Nigeria particularly Niger state. Like Boko Haram, **ISGS** that operates in the Sahel also exercised a great deal of momentum and carried out devastating attacks against civilians accused of collaborating with security forces. While the group carried out 10 attacks, its killed 184 people.

For the groups that operate in the parts of Africa, **ASWJ** and **IS Affiliates** in North Africa were brutal and lethal in their attacks. In Northern Mozambique, ASWJ appeared resilient despite wave of surrenders. The group enjoyed some freedom of movement and expanded its attacks to new areas such as the Nampula Province and Acube district located in Cabo Delgado province. This movement and expansions could be curtailed if the various deployment enhance their coordination, collaboration, and intelligence sharing. For the North Africa region, particularly the Sinai Peninsula, - attacks focused on security forces. The resurgence of attacks in the Sinai Peninsula needs to be addressed to reassure the local population of their safety.

24. Focus on Epicentres

For the period under review, the **Sahel belt of West Africa** recorded the highest number of attacks (82), lower than those recorded in the Q1. Also, the region recorded the highest number of deaths (1,055) among the epicentres of terrorist and violent extremist activities. This represents a 24% increase in deaths over the previous reported period. The lethality rate for the Sahel is 13 deaths per attack, far higher than the general rate of 8 deaths per attack for the entire continent and higher than the Sahel lethality rate recorded in Q1. The data trend reveals a further deteriorating of the security situation in the Sahel, mainly caused by JNIM and ISGS hostilities and atrocities within the Liptako-Gourma area. Under the present circumstances, the G5 Sahel forces, which have been battling terrorist groups could further prove relevant, given the drawdown of Barkhane and Takuba forces in Mali. Mobilisation of forces, including provision of logistical and financial support could help the G5 Sahel forces weaken the hegemony of JNIM and ISGS within the Sahel Region. The **Lake Chad Basin** recorded a reduction in both attacks and deaths. There were 71 attacks that resulted in 505 deaths accounting for 7 deaths per attack, far lower than the Q1 rates.

Majority of the attacks in the LCB concentrated in the North-eastern Nigeria states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa and Far North Region of Cameroon. The MNJTF and national armies of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon continue to achieve operational successes against ISWAP and Boko Haram in the LCB. The frequency of Al-Shabaab's attack in the **Horn of Africa** was reduced. Renewed and strategic CT operations by SNA, AFRICOM and ATMIS limited to a large extent the movement of the group. ADF/ISCAP and other violent extremist groups including M23 and CODECO continued their hostilities in the **Great Lakes Region**. In all, 67% of all attacks and 86% of all deaths occurred in the above-mentioned epicentres.

25. Counter-Terrorism Response

Security forces across the continent sustained their deliberate and planned counter terrorism operations against terrorist in their hideouts. In the Sahel, the Malian Armed Forces (FaMA) intensified its counter offensive against al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates within her territory. The intensification of the CT operation through air and ground operations resulted in the elimination and neutralisation of terrorist elements belonging to JNIM and ISGS. The FaMA exhibited good morale and determination to defeat terrorist groups. Given the resurgence of terrorist activities, regional and international support to Mali and other troops operating in the Sahel region could significantly improve the security situation in the Sahel. In the Lake Chad Basin, MNJTF continued its offensive and achieved some operational successes against ISWAP and Boko Haram. The extension of MNJTF mandate, if combined with the needed logistical and financial support could further weaken the momentum and cohesion of terrorists in LCB. In Northern Mozambique, coordination between SAMIM, **Mozambique** Defence Armed Forces (FADM) and Rwandan Forces is a sine qua non in nipping insurgency, violent extremism, and terrorism in the bud in Northern Mozambique. In all 889 terrorists were neutralised in deliberate CT operations, in addition to the 385 killed in reprisal attacks, bringing the total number of terrorists eliminated within the period to 1,274. The need for CT operations to be conducted in compliance with regional and international humanitarian laws and frameworks as well as respect for human rights must be vigorously pursued to ensure the protection civilians population in such counter offensive operations.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON WAY FORWARD

Terrorist and violent extremist activities continued across the continent. The available data shows that attacks and deaths in the second quarter (Q2) decreased as compared to the first quarter (Q1) of 2022. For emphasis, Q1 registered 379 deaths resulting in 2, 824 deaths while the Q2 recorded 320 attacks resulting in 2 588 deaths. The percentage rate of decline for attacks and deaths is 16% and 8% respectively. The type of attacks remained consistent in both periods while the pattern relating to primary targets and category of deaths changed slightly. Attacks against civilians reduced while those against, military and security forces increased. Even though the general number of terrorist attacks and deaths decreased marginally, most of the terrorist groups operating on the continent exhibited a great level of momentum. Despite the numerous CT efforts by state authorities concern, terrorist structures seem to be resilient. Preventative approaches and mechanisms that seek to build the resilience of local communities by addressing their vulnerabilities could go a long way to deny terrorist and violent extremists group their freedom of space and movement, thereby culminating into degrading their capabilities and cohesion.

For the period under review the Sahel belt of West Africa became hotspots of complex and sophisticated attacks. Although the region recorded a decline in the number of attacks as compared to the previous reported period, fatalities resulting from attacks increased sharply, indicating a further deteriorating security situation in the region. This may be attributed to the decrease in military offensives against the hegemony of JNIM and ISGS following the withdrawal and redeployment of Barkhane and Takuba Forces as well as the cascading effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic and the sanction imposed by ECOWAS on Mali which have aggravated the deteriorating security and humanitarian crisis situations making the population more vulnerable to terrorists' recruitment drive. The G5 Sahel Joint Force and its member states have deployed efforts that have degraded the fighting capacity of the terrorist groups operating in the Sahel region to some extent. However, intensification of efforts in the mobilization of additional resources for the joint force, particularly financial and technical support, as well as economic development support aimed at addressing the dire humanitarian situation in the Sahel region could go a long way to ensure peace, stability, and development in the region.

The period witnessed an expansion of the threat of terrorism from the Sahel region toward the Gulf of Guinea countries, particularly Benin and Togo. The terrorist groups appear to be executing a grand strategy of expanding their geographical reach, with the aim of controlling national territories to run criminal economies to sustain their violent activities. Without prejudice to the grand strategy being exhibited by terrorist groups, prevailing multidimensional socioeconomic challenges such as local context specific community grievances, lack of development and absence of basic services in border communities, climate change impact, governance deficit continuum trajectory, and humanitarian crisis compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic are vulnerability factors in coastal states that could serve as catalysts to fester a further expansion of violent extremism and terrorism. Given the heightened high-risk level, littorals states may have to elevate their respective states of preparedness to effectively respond to the fallout of the insecurity in the Sahel and the consequent humanitarian crises based on regular security risk analysis. Under the current circumstances, the full operationalisation and the implementation of the Accra Initiative could prove strategically, operationally, and tactically relevant in nipping the threats in the bud. In addition, PVE policies and mechanisms that create a conducive economic atmosphere and a sense of belonging, particularly for young people, to be productive and contribute to the socio-economic development of their communities and countries could help ameliorate the vulnerability factors.

During the period ISWAP dominated terrorist activities in the Lake Chad Basin while Boko Haram was relegated to Cameroon's Far-North region. The simmering tensions between the groups could now be translating into contention for operational spaces, therefore Cameroonian security forces may have to re-strategize to effectively degrade the group's capacities in the area. Enhancing the tactical operational

capabilities of the deployed could help disrupt the groups freedom of movement. Also, ISWAP and Boko Haram's presence in South-West Nigeria states after their penetration in Niger, Ondo and Kogi appears to generate some concerns over the widespread attacks in these new areas. The trajectory of this situation, if left to continue uninhibited, could overtime, develop into entrenched insurgencies and would be extremely difficult to dislodge.

The resurgence of IS in Sinai Peninsula witnessed during the reporting period calls for an urgent need to interrogate the recent escalation in IS activity to understand what is emboldening the group's momentum and resilience. The Egyptian government has heavily invested in the Sinai Peninsula with the aim of getting the population to return to their communities. The investments drive is also aimed at assuring the communities, the government's commitment, and ability to protect them against insurgents' atrocities. Indeed, for a long time, the Egyptian Army weakened the capabilities, capacities, and momentum of terrorist elements in the Sinai. The recent surge in terrorist attacks if not reversed, could derail government's efforts, and put local economic development initiatives in shambles.

The Northern Mozambique Province of Cabo Delgado also experienced the spread of terrorism into other areas previously not affected. Insurgents advanced into the southern districts of Cabo Delgado province, launching sporadic attacks in Ancuabe and Chiure district within Cabo Delgado and Nampula province, all areas previously unaffected by the nearly five-year old insurgency. The growing foreign military deployments in Mozambique appear to take precedence over soft approaches that could address the underlying root causes of violence in Cabo Delgado. Despite the series of counter terrorism operational successes of the Mozambican security forces and international forces, insurgent structures seem to be resilient. The kinetic militaristic approaches if combined with local community based preventing violent extremism initiatives could help defeat terrorism in Mozambique.